{"product_id":"reason-and-proper-function-a-response-to-alvin-plantinga-9780578500249","title":"Reason and Proper Function: A Response to Alvin Plantinga","description":"\u003cp\u003e Alvin Plantinga, in \u003cem\u003eWarrant: The Current Debate\u003c\/em\u003e, notes that\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ethere is a long history in Anglo-American epistemology that\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003etraces back to the classical internalist views of Rene Descartes\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eand John Locke. Internalism is the view that an individual\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ehas special access to that quantity or quality that makes true\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ebelief into knowledge. This internalism, according to Plantinga, \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eis motivated by deontology - or epistemic duty fulfillment.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eClosely connected with epistemic deontology is justification.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eJustification (or what Plantinga prefers to call 'warrant') is that\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003equantity or quality, enough of which makes true belief into\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eknowledge. Plantinga strongly objects to the deontological\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eview of justification, claiming that no amount of duty fulfillment\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ecan get us to knowledge. He says justification is neither\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003enecessary nor sufficient for warrant.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eIn Warrant: The Current Debate\u003c\/em\u003e (hereafter WCD) Plantinga\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eexamines several versions of internalism - from Classical\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eand Post-Classical Chisholmian internalism, several forms of\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ecoherentism, to reliabilism - to show that none of these views\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eget us to that quantity or quality enough of which makes true\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ebelief into knowledge. Plantinga rejects all of these views, \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003earguing that what is needed is a view that takes into account the\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eproper function of our cognitive faculties. He then proposes to\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003egive a more accurate account of warrant in \u003cem\u003eWarrant and Proper\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFunction\u003c\/em\u003e (WPF). Plantinga's theory is that a belief is warranted\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eif it is formed by cognitive faculties functioning properly in an\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eappropriate environment and according to a good design plan.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e The purpose of this book is to examine Plantinga's view of\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ecognitive malfunction in connection with his view of warrant\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eand his rejection of the traditional view of justification. I\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ewill argue that the cognitive faculty of reason does not and\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ecannot malfunction in the way that Plantinga either explicitly\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eor implicitly suggests. Consequently Plantinga's criticism of\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ejustification does not stand. I argue further that if reason is\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003enot subject to malfunction and is thus reliable, the traditional\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eview of justification - having appropriate reasons for belief\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ein conjunction with true belief, possibly with the addition of\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ea fourth condition (the carefulness criterion) - will get us to\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eknowledge.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eAbout the Author\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eBurton, Kelly Fitzsimmons:\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/b\u003e - Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton, Ph.D. has been a college Philosophy professor in Phoenix, AZ since 2003. She desires to see a new direction in contemporary philosophy that leads away from skepticism and towards knowledge. She enjoys reading Plato and arguing with Nietzsche. Kelly loves philosophical conversation and regularly engages in public philosophy. When not teaching or conversing, Kelly enjoys time with her husband and two cattle dogs in the Arizona desert. You may find more about Kelly's work on her website: http: \/\/retphi.com","brand":"Public Philosophy Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":50844762472722,"sku":"9780578500249","price":8.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0831\/4771\/8930\/files\/img_1395cdfd-c0e1-4b79-bfa4-1e181f93ec84.jpg?v=1737331665","url":"https:\/\/surprise-castle.myshopify.com\/products\/reason-and-proper-function-a-response-to-alvin-plantinga-9780578500249","provider":"Surprise Castle","version":"1.0","type":"link"}